'a series of enormous eight-story high cantilevered steel frames transferring their loads 72ft from each corner to columns centred above the nine-story high piers'
The site acquisition process for Citicorp Center required five years and cost $50 million, at the time, a record sum in New York City (http://proteus). Almost 30% of the site was controlled by St Peter's Lutheran Church (Dupre, 1996) , located since 1903 on the north-east corner of the block. First National City Bank, which later became Citicorp, agreed that the congregation would retain its location, receive a fee of $9 million as well as the shell of a new church to replace its existing structure. As part of its new corporate headquarters, the bank would construct an office tower utilizing a portion of the air rights above the new St Peter's (Stern, 1995) .
That decision led to a unique structural system for a tower supported on a central service core and four, 24ft (7.3m) sq, 114ft (34.7m) high piers placed not at the corners but at the centre of each tower face. The edges of the tower floors were then supported on a series of enormous eight-story high cantilevered steel frames transferring their loads 72ft (21.9m) from each corner to columns centred above the ninestory high piers.
The extraordinary structural efficiency of the steel frame made the tower significantly lighter than a conventional structure of its height and therefore far more subject to lateral harmonic vibration due to the buffeting of winds. Working with other consultants, LeMessurier designed a system to diminish the accelerations caused by the vibration. The tuned mass damper, a 30 x 30 x 6ft (9.1 x 9.1 x 1.8m) block of concrete weighing some 400 tons (362 tonnes) floating on a film of oil and linked to the top of the structural frame by hydraulic springs, was the first of its kind in a tall building.
A multi-million dollar investment
Citicorp Center was designed and constructed during an extended period of economic malaise in the city. In the 1970s dozens of major corporations departed, 600,000 jobs were lost (Clark and Parrott, 2000) and, in the face of a fiscal crisis, the President's 1975 decision on Federal aid prompted the legendary Daily News headline 'FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD'. Ground was broken early in 1974, the structural steel was topped out in October 1976 , and the complex was dedicated a year later (Stern, 1995) . Even before its completion, full-page colour advertisements appeared featuring a photo-realistic view of the new church and the soaring tower. Citicorp's ad copy brashly proclaimed:
A Eugene Kremer illuminated seven-story galleria with a lushly landscaped courtyard, was surrounded by shops and restaurants. Brick-paved public outdoor spaces incorporated seating, sweeping stepped terraces, access to the subway and space for concerts and other events sponsored by Citicorp and by the church. Stubbins and his collaborators had succeeded. The new building epitomized the client's intention to create a visible statement announcing its corporate identity, celebrating its steadfast loyalty to New York, its commitment to innovation, and its performance as a responsible citizen in the neighbourhood and the larger city.
Extended feature articles in leading American and international architectural journals extolled the project. Citicorp Center was the subject of broad attention and great praise in the popular media as well. The city, client, the architect, the structural engineer and the multitude of others that had contributed to realization of the project took understandable pride in what had been created. More than a generation later, the tower remained a New York landmark, and an important symbol for the successor owner, Citigroup, which adorned its 1999 Annual Review with a striking image of the still potent corporate icon.
A potential disaster averted leads to … The initial acclaim had not subsided when, through a series of serendipitous events, William LeMessurier recognized in June 1978 that Citicorp tower's steel frame was structurally inadequate (Morgenstern, 1995) . Information about the details of his discovery and the actions that averted an epic disaster was not shared with the public for the better part of two decades by LeMessurier, other engineers, academics, attorneys, equipment manufacturers, construction contractors, government officials, public safety and emergency response agencies, or by Citicorp.
'celebrating its steadfast loyalty to New York, its commitment to innovation, and its performance as a responsible citizen'
Once the public silence was broken, in a lengthy 29 (Taylor, 2000) , the author cites William LeMessurier's efforts in the Citicorp case and incorporates the full text of The New Yorker article in an appendix.
A critical reexamination
A high profile corporate client, world famous design professionals, an innovative landmark skyscraper in the congested centre of the nation's largest city, and the prospect of a catastrophic structural failure provide an abundance of material for a compelling tale. Add to that the received wisdom of ethicists that the Citicorp case exemplifies the best in professional ethical behaviour and the stage is set for critical reexamination. I will briefly examine six facets of the Citicorp Center tower case.
Wind loads
LeMessurier employed an ingenious, radically unconventional structural frame in the Citicorp Tower. He reports considering only wind loading normal to the building faces. The Building Code of the City of New York did not call for analysis of socalled quartering winds and LeMessurier states that he did not examine the effects of quartering winds until after Citicorp tower was occupied. It was then that he discovered the unexpectedly high stresses they produced on the structural frame (Morgenstern, 1995) .
'exemplary behavior -encompassing honesty, courage, adherence to ethics, and social responsibility -remains a testimony to the ideal meaning of the word, 'professional'''
In some respects the design of virtually every building is a prototype. Nonetheless, when a major deviation from conventional practice is contemplated for a key element affecting the safety of an enormous urban structure, the professional has an obligation to ensure that the analyses employed go beyond the routine techniques developed for structures transferring loads in significantly different ways. As LeMessurier himself put it in discussing the structural problems in Boston's John Hancock Tower, 'Any time you depart from established practice, make 10 times the effort, 10 times the investigation. Especially on a very largescale project' (Campbell, 1988) .
'there are singular instances of professional rectitude that exemplify the core values of competence, accountability and honesty underlying the [NCARB] Rules of Conduct'
Like many other laws and regulations safeguarding public safety, building codes specify minimum standards and they do not necessarily reflect the state of the art or the prevailing standard of care. Indeed, although during the early 1970s the New York Building Code made no mention of wind loads other than those produced by winds acting at right-angles to building faces, many other tall structures in New York and elsewhere had been designed considering the effects of quartering winds. Until adoption of a new code in late 1968, New York had for some time required that all structures be designed 'to resist, in the structural frame, horizontal wind pressure from any direction' (1969 Manual New York Building Laws) . As early as 1899 the city's building code had required consideration of 'wind pressure, taken in any direction on any part of the structure' (The Building Code, 1899). Although the code's wording had been amended by 1915, the thrust remained evident: wind pressure was to be considered in 'all buildings over 150 feet in height … allowing for wind in any direction' (Code of Ordinances, 1916 Thomas Gasbarro, P.E., Chief Structural Engineer in the large New York architectural firm HLW, comments 'Any structural engineer who is designing a building of any height is well aware that wind can act in any direction, and doesn't need a Code to tell him so'. Gasbarro also 'seriously doubts' that the presence or absence of language in the code regarding wind direction 'had any effect on the practice of any structural engineer designing a building in New York City'.
5
In fact, two senior members of William LeMessurier's firm who were directly involved with Citicorp state that quartering winds were considered early in the development of the building's frame. From the start of conceptual design in 1970, Robert J. McNamara was the managing principal for Citicorp in LeMessurier Associates' Cambridge office. McNamara states that at the time of the tower's design it was customary for engineers to consider the effects of quartering winds on the structure of tall buildings. He reports that for Citicorp tower 'the effects of quartering wind were originally studied by Bill LeMessurier' who 'concluded that the quartering wind did not govern the design and need not be further considered'.
6 Stanley Goldstein was partner in charge of LeMessurier Associates' New York office where the construction drawings for the tower were prepared. Goldstein states that in design of tall buildings 'quartering wind is always considered'.
7 He explains that Citicorp's 'wind bracing system, which seemed so simple and easy to understand … proved to be deceptive'. 8 
Bolted joints
LeMessurier's design and the tower's construction drawings called for five, full-penetration welded joints in each of the eight-story high diagonal steel members transferring loads from the tower's corners to the columns at the centre of each face. Offering Citicorp a credit of $250,000, the structural steel fabricator proposed substituting bolted joints. The proposal was accepted. Employing the loads at each joint calculated by LeMessurier's firm, the fabricator designed bolted connections and prepared shop drawings that were then reviewed and approved by the engineers for fabrication and construction. Although less strong than welded joints, the bolted connections were entirely adequate for the designated loads. LeMessurier reports that it was his associates in the New York office who studied the proposal and approved the change. He asserts that he learned of the substitution only after Citicorp's completion during a conversation about using fullpenetration welded connections for another project (Morgenstern, 1995) .
'any structural engineer who is designing a building of any height is well aware that wind can act in any direction, and doesn't need a Code to tell him so'
When a major departure from the construction documents is proposed for a critical system affecting the health, safety and welfare of the public, the decision ought to involve the key persons in the design of the system. 
Professional responsibility
LeMessurier acknowledges that his analyses undertaken after the building was completed and occupied revealed that quartering winds produced far higher stresses in the diagonal members than had been understood. Emergency consultations in Canada with the director and staff of the wind tunnel laboratory, where tests had been run on a model of the tower while it was still in design during 1973, led to appreciation that the problem was significantly more critical than he had realized. Returning from Canada to Cambridge, he met with a trusted colleague and then drove to his Maine summer home where for several days he carefully worked through a series of detailed structural calculations. LeMessurier concluded that failure of a bolted joint at the 30th floor was likely in a 16-year storm, a storm creating winds of 70 miles per hour for five minutes. Among the courses of action he briefly considered was driving along the Maine Turnpike at a hundred miles an hour and steering into a bridge abutment without telling anyone else about the problem he had discovered (Morgenstern, 1995 and Fatal Flaw, 1996 might be a rather stimulating experience. (Fatal Flaw, 1996) LeMessurier also explains that he contemplated remaining silent about the inadequacy of the tower's structural frame. Observing that only staff members at the laboratory where the tower's responses to wind forces had been modelled knew of the full implication of the problem, LeMessurier opined, 'My friends up in Canada were so professional, they would keep their traps shut forever' (Morgenstern, 1995; LeMessurier, 1995a) . In his 1995 presentation to an audience of MIT engineering faculty and students, LeMessurier claimed he knew of an important 50-story building that was likely to collapse, that was 'totally under-designed'. After declaring that he would not identify the endangered structure, he concluded with the assertion 'there are a lot of them out there' (LeMessurier, 1995a).
Public statements
In actuality LeMessurier informed the architect's attorney, his own liability insurance company, the architect and the owner. Soon afterward other engineers, consultants and contractors were engaged to study, monitor and repair the building. Local building officials, the Red Cross, the police and other emergency response agencies were told of the situation and plans for remediating the structural inadequacy of the tower were developed and implemented.
Early in the repair process, the owner issued a statement to the press that made no mention of the threat the building posed to the public health, safety and welfare. LeMessurier was aware of the statement, and had supplied the new data regarding marginally higher wind speeds that was then used as the explanation for the remedial welding of 2in x 6ft (51mm x 1.828m) steel plates over hundreds of bolted joints in the structural frame (Morgenstern, 1995) .
'when a major departure from the construction documents is proposed for a critical system … the decision ought to involve the key persons in the design of the system'
In a Wall Street Journal interview, Henry DeFord III, Citicorp Senior Vice President responsible for the corporation's building operations, explained, 'engineers have assured the bank that the building isn't in any danger. The work is being done to anticipate the impossible that might happen'. (Wall Street Journal, 1978) Contacted by the New York Daily News, DeFord elaborated:
As it is, the building could withstand a 100-year wind … We are a very cautious organization -we wear both belts and suspenders here. We dont [sic] want people concerned, so we sent out a press release announcing the work. (Martin, 1978) Although the highest wind speed ever recorded in Manhattan was 113mph, later in the same 9 August 1978 Daily News story, Acting Building Commissioner Blaise Parascandola, whose office placed him in a position of public trust, reinforced Citicorp's assurances by observing, '… of course it's improbable, but there's always the chance of winds up to 150mph, which … could break bolts. This way we'll be safe'. There are just six Fundamental Canons in the National Society of Professional Engineers Code of Ethics and just seven in the American Society of Civil Engineers Code of Ethics. Canon 3 of each code states that in the fulfilment of their professional duties engineers shall 'Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner' (NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers and ASCE Code of Ethics).
Public safety
Elaborate emergency evacuation plans were developed not only for Citicorp Tower, but also for 156 city blocks (Fatal Flaw, 1996) in the neighbourhood of what was then the seventh tallest building in the world. These events took place during mid-and late summer, the hurricane season when the greatest threat of structural failure inducing wind speeds existed. The plans were kept secret from the general public, from other property owners and tens of thousands of residents, shop and office workers, and others in the neighbourhood who were to be informed only if a hurricane were bearing down on New York. 'A Red Cross estimate indicated that if the building collapsed, up to 200,000 people could lose their lives' (BBC Online).
The autonomy of other stakeholders was denied by the paternalistic behaviour to which LeMessurier, Stubbins, Citicorp officers, Red Cross, city officials and a host of others were party.
Speaking at MIT on 17 November 1995, LeMessurier told his audience of faculty members and engineering students at a videotaped Mechanical Engineering Colloquium:
We had to cook up a line of bull, I'll tell you. And white lies at this point are entirely moral. You don't want to spread terror in the community to people who don't need to be terrorized. We were terrorized, no question about that. (LeMessurier, 1995a) 'Engineering Ethics', an October 1996 cover story in the American Society of Civil Engineers' journal Civil Engineering described Citicorp Center, its design, the discovery of its structural flaws and the emergency repairs (Goldstein and Rubin, 1996) . The story was influential in stimulating the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Board of Ethical Review (BER) to consider a scenario strikingly similar to the facts of Citicorp.
11 Published as Case 98-9, the BER based its findings on six sections of the NSPE Code of Ethics in concluding that while:
The (LeMessurier, 1995b ) that year, the paper spans from his graduate student days at MIT through his role in the structural design of landmark high-rise towers across the nation and abroad. He explains in the 'Introduction' that he '… will describe the learning process through discussion of several design problems of real buildings'. Understandably, Citicorp is treated at length yet there is no mention of its structural crisis or of the lessons learned from it. In late 1991, some years before the ASCE Congress, writer Joe Morgenstern, who had learned of Citicorp tower's structural crisis during a dinner party conversation, telephoned LeMessurier. After several weeks' delay while he checked Morgenstern's references and reviewed samples of his work, LeMessurier and he travelled from Cambridge to the house in Maine where the story was recounted in minute detail during a long weekend. The manuscript for 'The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis' and The New Yorker's fact-checking efforts were completed two years before its publication 13 at the end of May 1995 less than two months after LeMessurier elected to omit all reference to the crisis in discussing Citicorp with his audience of engineers.
Silence and outrage
Professionals' initial responses to the Citicorp Center tower case may have derived from its dramatic journalistic presentation, and from an understandable desire to perceive their eminent colleague at the centre of the drama as hero. Nonetheless, architects and engineers are well acquainted with professional norms and professional codes of ethics. And ethicists who study the professions continue to add to the enormous body of critical case literature and so I am perplexed by the absence of a reevaluation of the conventional wisdom on this celebrated case.
Although I have invested a good deal of effort in exploring this case, some of the concerns I have voiced are based on matters that are immediately evident in The New Yorker article. Within months of that story's publication, the concerns of three engineers directly involved with the tower during its design, construction or repair were reported in Engineering News Record. A 20 November 1995 article by Richard Korman (1995b) , 'Critics Grade Citicorp Confession', reported that two senior engineers in William LeMessurier's office engaged in the design of the Citicorp Center tower disputed significant aspects of The New Yorker account. Three weeks earlier, an Engineering News Record article, 'LeMessurier's Confession' (Korman, 1995a) concluded by reporting that the office of Leslie Robertson, the distinguished engineer who served as a consultant to Citicorp during the crisis, had written a letter implying that the problems were worse than LeMessurier acknowledged in The New Yorker. 
